Introduction
An important function of democratic systems is to make public officials accountable to citizens. 2 This control works through the incumbents' fear of the next election and by offering voters the opportunity to "throw out the rascals". A substantial theoretical literature has used the principalagent model to formally investigate these ideas in an attempt to clarify what makes officials accountable and, ultimately, how officials' behaviour can be aligned with citizens' interests.
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Although several studies have been conducted on the determinants of corruption, much less is known on the empirical processes that might lead voters to "throw out the rascals". Political punishment of corrupt politicians involves many actors in practice, and calls into question the functioning of party organizations, the information available from mass media, voters' awareness of political matters and their eventual response in the ballot box. Voters' choices are in turn mediated by their perceptions of events and by partisanship: when choosing whether or not to punish corrupt politicians, voters may trade off valence issues with ideological considerations.
The scandal that erupted in the United Kingdom in May 2009 concerning MPs' abuse of expenses allowances constitutes an ideal setting to study accountability channels in some detail and to identify some of the causal links at play. First, the scandal involves a well-defined set of political actors, namely the members of parliament who were in office in May 2009, who all faced the same rules and constraints regarding their expenses. Second, the scandal erupted within a very short time frame for all MPs involved and focused on the same issue for all MPs, namely abusing the allowance system. These two features make scandal involvement comparable across MPs and provide a marked identification advantage compared to either cross-country studies or studies that, even within a country, compare scandals which occurred in different periods, concerning different sorts of political actors and different types of wrongdoing. Moreover, the scandal was salient in public debate for several months and it was followed by an election only one year after it began.
Following the scandal, an investigation was held that led to an accurate reconstruction of the amount misappropriated by each MP in the February 2010 'Review of past ACA payments' (hereafter 'the Legg report'). This provides another characteristic of the scandal that makes it particularly suitable for empirical study: the availability of an objective, accurately defined measure of monetary wrongdoing. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that MPs could not have anticipated the level of detail at which information on their expenses was eventually offered to the public. Although aggregate Although most theories tend to study accountability mechanisms by focussing on a simplified voter-politician relationship, democratic processes rely on a number of actors who often play a crucial role in the process of "throwing out the rascals" in practice. Our empirical analysis takes the complexity of the accountability process into account and studies the scandal from a variety of angles.
Figure 1 illustrates our theoretical framework. Starting from the abuse of the expenses allowance system by some MPs, media outlets decide how much coverage to devote to the event and specifically to each MP. Since, unlike in other dimensions of a politician's activity, it is very difficult for citizens to directly observe corruption, it is therefore only if and when abuses are reported by the media that they may become known to citizens. When receiving information on the possible wrongdoing of their MPs, however, citizens are not simply passively absorbing the news and updating their beliefs on politician's honesty. Voter's perception of their MPs' involvement in wrongdoing is mediated by a number of individual variables, and notably by partisanship. Finally, perceptions of wrongdoing should turn into punishment. First, voters can punish politicians they perceive as corrupt in the ballot box. Second, punishment can predate the actual voting stage if an MPs involved in the scandal decides to stand down and not face the voters; in alternative, party leaders can decide to deselect involved
MPs. Once again, we expect the media to play an important role since standing down or de-selection, when caused by scandal involvement, are likely to be the consequences of an anticipation of punishment in the ballot box.
To simplify, we have three key links in our accountability framework: 1) a link from malfeasance to news, with respect to which we will ask questions about possible media bias and the role performed by media outlets as watchdogs of power; 2) a link from news to perception, with respect to which we ask how partisanship and other individual characteristics affect the way news are processed and incorporated into perceptions about MPs; 3) a link from perceptions to action, whereby voters punish corrupt politicians in the ballot box, or expected punishment induces politicians to stand down (or political parties to deselect corrupt MPs).
This paper analyses these links in reverse order, starting from the final outcomes and moving back to media coverage, and tries to quantify their relevance in the accountability process. A constant theme in our analysis is the contrast between media reporting and the actual monetary damage to taxpayers as gauged by the Legg report. Our conclusion is that what matters for voters' punishment is only the former, although media coverage is also partially explained by the amount of money misappropriated.
We find that an MP's scandal involvement, when measured by media coverage, led to a higher probability to leave Parliament in 2010. On the other hand, the monetary measure of wrongdoing appears to predict the probability to remain in Parliament after the 2010 election very poorly. Scandalrelated media coverage both compelled the most involved MPs to stand down and reduced the voting share of standing MPs. We run placebo regressions to show that post-scandal media coverage does not predict pre-scandal retirements and does not predict 2001-05 changes in vote shares. We also find that voters' punishment was directed at individual MPs rather than their parties: while the incumbent party was punished when a sitting MP was involved in the scandal their party was not punished in constituencies where MPs decided to stand down. Punishment of corrupt politicians in the ballot box, in any event, was not overwhelming and did not reduce their chances to be re-elected. Our conclusion is that what drives the accountability process is media coverage of the scandal rather than the amounts actually misappropriated by individual MPs.
We then use the British Election Study 2010 panel to gain some understanding of what drives voters' perception of wrongdoing and how perceived involvement relates to actual voting behaviour.
The perceived involvement of an MP turns out to be well explained by actual wrongdoing (as measured by the Legg report), but also by a few individual characteristics of the respondents: education and trust in other people, for example are both negatively associated with MP's perceived involvement, even when we restrict our attention to within-constituency variation. Punishment in the ballot box (in the form of a changed vote between 2010 and 2005) is directed to MPs who are perceived by their constituents to be involved in wrongdoing. We show, however, that partisanship plays a particularly important role in the accountability chain: perceived involvement of an MP is reduced, ceteris paribus, when the MP belongs to the political party the respondent feels closer to.
Regarding the link between malfeasance and media coverage, we find that the British press acted mostly as a watchdog during the scandal. Controlling for the pre-scandal media coverage of each MP, we find that MPs who were later recognized by the Legg report as more heavily involved were also more heavily covered by the press on average. Ceteris paribus, government members and frontbenchers of the main opposition party were more likely to be covered (in relation to the scandal) than backbenchers. We find no detectable partisan coverage, in the sense that patterns of coverage of specific newspapers do not appear to be influenced by their political leaning. Other variables turn out to be more important: for example, female MPs have, ceteris paribus, received more scrutiny than their male colleagues.
MPs' personal characteristics did not matter in general, with the exception of gender: ceteris paribus, punishment has been heavier for female MPs. Hence, along with our findings on media coverage, we uncover a consistent pattern showing that female MPs were generally more vulnerable subjects during and after the scandal.
In the next section, we provide some background information on the scandal and on
Westminster's allowance system. In Section 3 we present and discuss the data. Section 4 presents our results on the key outputs of the accountability process: the effects of the scandal on decisions to stand down and on the voting returns of MPs involved in the scandal. Section 5 presents survey-based evidence from the British Election Study on individual perceptions of the scandal and on the relationship between perception and voting behaviour. Section 6 analyses press coverage, asking questions about possible partisan bias in the amount of news provided about each MP. Section 7
provides an overall assessment of the accountability process and attempts to quantify chains of causality. Section 8 discusses our findings, relates them to existing literature, and illustrates how they contribute to our understanding of the role played by elections and the press in keeping public officials accountable.
The MPs' Expenses Scandal: background information

Brief description of the MPs Expenses Allowance system
The annual salary for an MP at the time the scandal erupted was £64,766. 
Background information on the expenses scandal
The publication of detailed MP expenses and the public scandal that followed represents the culmination of a political process that was driven by two predominant factors: the slow According to the Assistant Editor of The Telegraph, the insider had been given a one-off payment of £110,000 for the data, which the newspaper felt was worthwhile on public interest grounds (Winnett and Rayner 2009 ). The House of Commons appealed to the Metropolitan Police to start a criminal investigation about the leak, but the police refused to do so, since it would not serve the public interest.
The details of MP expenses shocked and angered the public, and forced leaders from all three major political parties to react immediately. Some of the claims became symbolic of political 7 The White Paper was written before the establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive. 
The data
Our study brings together a number of existing sources, and merges it with data collected and 10 Indicating with N the number of articles related to an MP, our variable is then log(N+1).
11 The amount of money reduced on appeal is subtracted from the amount recommended by the Legg Report.
12 Information about individual MP roles, voting behaviour, and dates of office were extracted from the PublicWhip database. 13 The PublicWhip profiles for each MP were used to identify which Members were on the front bench for constituency boundaries in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland between general elections. 16 The notional boundary changes developed by Rallings and Thrasher (2007) were used to identify constituencies in which there were minor adjustments and would thus provide more reliable estimates of changing electoral behaviour. Our baseline estimates refer to constituencies whose boundaries changed by 10% or less. We conduct several robustness checks by varying maximum boundary changes allowed up to 0 (only constituencies that did not change).
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We omitted a number of MPs from our analysis. The party leaders for the three main political parties at the time of the expenses scandal (Gordon Brown, David Cameron, and Nick Clegg) and Speaker Michael Martin were excluded, since they were mentioned frequently in newspaper reports independently of their own expenses. We also omit the four aforementioned MPs from the House of Commons who were under police investigation at the time of the Legg Report, since their claims were not audited by agreement with the police.
For our constituency-level regressions, our dataset has been merged with electoral results data compiled by Pippa Norris. have the advantage that many questions about individual predispositions and party identification were asked before the scandal, but the disadvantage of substantial attrition and a much smaller sample size.
The electoral consequences of the scandal
Were politicians involved in the scandal punished by the electoral process? We begin by analysing the key outcome of the accountability process: whether scandal involvement explains the likelihood to leave parliament. We will then move to a more detailed consideration of the accountability mechanism by distinguishing between MPs who decided to stand down and MPs that stood for re-election.
Throwing out the rascals
Were MPs who abused the expenses system more likely to leave parliament? This is the key observable outcome of the accountability process, and we begin our analysis by estimating how different degrees of scandal involvement correlate with the probability of not being in parliament after the 2010 election. We estimate the following equation by OLS:
( 1) where is a dummy variable equal to 1 if MP i is not in parliament after the 2010 election.
Involvement in the scandal is measured in two ways: the first is by using news-post, controlling for news-pre; the second is by using Legg-money. We also introduce a vector of control variables to account for other factors that may determine the probability to leave parliament. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 , where we report simple regressions without control variables, show that scandal-related news coverage is positively and significantly correlated with the probability of leaving parliament, while the amount of money misappropriated is not. In column 3, we use both indicators and again news-post displays a positive and statistically significant coefficient. This conclusion is not substantially altered when we control for MPs and constituency characteristics, although the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is now smaller. A 1% increase in scandal-related news coverage (controlling for prescandal coverage levels) leads to about 3% higher probability of leaving parliament.
The coefficients estimated in Table 1 suggest that the probability of leaving Parliament is positively related with press coverage but not related to the actual amount of money that an MP has misappropriated. These coefficients, however, do not imply that the relation between press coverage and leaving parliament is causal. We will now distinguish between standing down and retirement in the ballot box, with the aim to provide causal estimates separately for the two mechanisms
Retirement decisions
As mentioned above, an unprecedented number of MPs either retired or were deselected before the 2010 general election. Of the 152 MPs who did not run in the 2010 general election, 89 stepped down or were deselected in May 2009 or later. In this section we ask if standing down, whether due to party pressure or to avoid a likely defeat, has been one of the accountability channels that followed the scandal. In other words, did MPs involved in the scandal stand down with a higher probability? We estimate the following equation by OLS:
( 2) where is a dummy equal to one if the MP announces her decision to stand down after 9 May 2009. We use the MPs who announced their decision to retire before 8 May 2009, i.e. before the scandal erupted, as the control group. Hence, for each specification that uses post-scandal retirement decision, we run a placebo regression using pre-scandal retirement announcements. Table 2 reports our baseline results. In column 1, we regress a dummy variable for the decision to stand down on scandal-related media coverage of the MP, controlling for pre-scandal coverage of each MP and including a battery of individual and constituency-level control variables. 20 .
The coefficient of news-post is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that MPs covered more in association with the expenses scandal (and controlling for their pre-scandal popularity in the media) were more likely to retire. A 1% increase in news coverage leads to a 5% higher probability to 20 We have first run simple regressions without control variables. The estimated coefficients of interest are remarkably stable across different specifications. We only report here our benchmark results, with a full set of control variables. Other estimates are available from the authors upon request.
stand down. In column 2, we perform a placebo regression: we repeat the estimation of column 1 but use as dependent variable a dummy for decisions to stand down announced before the scandal. The coefficient of news-post is now negative and significant at 10% level.
Retirement decisions are, however, much less robustly associated with the amount of money actually misappropriated by MPs, as shown in columns 3 and 4, which use Legg-money as an explanatory variable. We again find a positive coefficient on post-scandal retirement and a negative one on pre-scandal retirements. In this case, however, these coefficients are always far from acceptable statistical significance. In columns 5 and 6, we include both media coverage and money owed: once again the results confirm that what drives retirement is media coverage and not the amount of money misappropriated. The placebo regression displays no significant coefficients. In other words, reassuringly, there is no impact of post-scandal news on pre-scandal retirement, which makes it more likely that the positive effect found in columns 1 and 5 represent a causal effect of media coverage on the decision to retire.
The control variables we include are mostly insignificant but it is worth noting that age has a positive impact on pre-scandal retirements but no effect on post-scandal retirement, which provides further evidence of the different nature of retirements (on average) in the two periods.
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We then try to uncover whether retirement can be related to specific political or individual characteristics, which could provide further indications about the possible mechanisms at play. For this purpose, we use interaction terms between news-post and some individual and constituency-level variables. Table 3 reports the coefficients of the interaction terms only (direct effects and other control variables are always included but not reported). In columns 1 and 2, we consider interactions between news-post and MPs' rebellions and absences. It is reasonable to assume that these variables matter to party whips and parties. Hence, they may also decide to take a more lenient or harder line on individual cases on the basis of good citizenship in Westminster. In columns 3 and 4, we consider the marginality of an electoral constituency, in columns 5 and 6 we consider party affiliation, and finally in columns 7 and 8 we consider other individual characteristics of the MPs. Columns 9 and 10 include all the interaction terms at the same time. 21 We also find that Conservative MPs were less likely than Labour MPs to stand down after the scandal, but not before it, while Liberal Democrat MPs were less likely to stand down than Labour before the scandal.
Our results suggest that more rebellious MPs were less likely to step down after the scandal in the face of the same amount of newspaper coverage. The interaction coefficient is significant at the 10% level in column 9, when all interactions are included. Our placebo regressions (in columns 2 and 10) show that there is no relationship between rebelliousness and pre-scandal retirements. This finding suggests that parties were not able to use the scandal as an excuse to force less palatable MPs into retirement. More rebellious MPs were also more likely to oppose a party's request to stand down. It is quite possible that MPs who are harder to remove can also afford to be more rebellious, indicating reverse causation.
Other columns show that the marginality of a constituency did not play a big role in inducing involved MPs to retire, and that Liberal Democrat MPs were generally less induced to retire from scandal news. Of the personal characteristics, the most noticeable difference between the pre-and post-scandal patterns can be found in gender: female MPs have a higher likelihood to stand down when facing news media pressure on the scandal. This result remains when we include all the other interactions, with the placebo regression indicating again that no such pattern can be found for prescandal retirement (compare columns 9 and 10).
To conclude, we find that media coverage increased the probability that an MP stood down after the scandal, but that the decision to stand down was not significantly influenced by the amount of money that MPs misappropriated. Party loyalty does not matter and, in fact, rebellious MPs are more likely to remain in the face of an equivalent amount of coverage, while the opposite holds for female MPs.
Punishment in the ballot box
We now want to test whether MPs who were involved in the expenses scandal but decided to run were punished by voters, and therefore saw their vote share decline compared to their 2005 performance. For the reasons outlined above, the sample was constrained by only considering constituencies where the boundary change was less than 10%, the party of the MP remains the same (i.e. MPs who become independent are omitted) and the same individual ran in the constituency in both general elections (i.e. the sitting MP was not from a by-election after 2005). With our sample restricted to constituencies that satisfied these characteristics, we use the difference in vote percentage between the 2005 and 2010 general elections for an incumbent MP (∆ as the dependent variable and estimate equations of this sort:
where, as before, Involvement is captured either by news-post (controlling for news-pre) or by
Legg-money, and X is a vector with the usual covariates. Table 4 shows that news coverage had a negative impact on electoral returns, indicating that implicated MPs have been, on average, punished by the voters. This result is robust across the various specifications in which we incrementally include control variables. Our estimates indicate that a 1% increase in news decreased the electoral return of the incumbent party (compared to its 2005 returns) by about 0.7 %. Legg-money has instead no effect on the change in the MP vote-share. Column 7 includes both news-post and Legg-money (with all the controls) and shows the same pattern: no effect of money misappropriated and a remarkably stable effect of the amount of news coverage.
We also find that electoral punishment was related to individual MPs and their involvement in the expenses scandal, and not the party to which they belonged. In other words, there is evidence that voters in the 2010 general election cast a "personal vote". Table 5 shows results differentiating changes in vote-share for seats in which the same individual ran in 2005 and 2010 and seats where the victorious MP in 2005 had stood down. From columns 1 and 2, it emerges that voters' punishment was personal: in constituencies where the incumbent MP is not standing, the vote share of the incumbent party is unaffected by the amount of scandal-related news coverage. The effect we found in Table 4 appears instead to be entirely driven by constituencies where the incumbent MP is standing again. The result is confirmed by column 3 where we use instead an interaction term between news coverage and a dummy for whether the incumbent MP is standing. In our benchmark specification with 10% boundary change, a 1% increase in news-post (controlling for news-pre) leads to a loss of 0.78% of the votes for incumbent MPs.
Models were tested for different thresholds of boundary changes -no change, less than 10% change, and less than 25% change. The same pattern emerges independently of our sample choice, although magnitudes and statistical significance varies when we use our most restricted sample (compare columns 3, 4 and 5). In columns 6-10 we repeat the same exercise by using a binary reelection dummy as dependent variable. Coefficients of news-post are never remotely significant across the various specifications, showing that, in spite of some vote loss, MPs involved in the scandal and standing for re-election did not suffer a decreased probability of re-election..
In Table 6 There is no specification in which the scandal-related media coverage displays any impact on 2001-05 vote changes.
We conclude that scandal-related media coverage had some impact on vote returns of involved
MPs but the amount of money actually misappropriated did not. We find that voters' punishment is personally directed to involved MPs rather than to their party, probably a consequence of the fact that the scandal involved all parties in Westminster more or less equally. In any event, patterns of representation of standing MPs cannot be expected to have been substantially altered by the scandal, as shown by the nil effect of re-election probabilities.
We also run regressions using turnout rates as dependent variable to see whether punishment was driven by abstention rather than voting for a different party. We found no significant effect of expenses scandal variables on turnout (results are not reported in the interest of space but are available from the authors).
Perception, punishment and partisanship
Having established that voters, on average, punished MPs with higher levels of press coverage in relation to the scandal, we now turn to a more detailed analysis of voters' perceptions regarding their MPs. We use individual survey data from the British Election Study 2010 (BES), which contains questions regarding the scandal. In particular, to gauge the perceived level of MP malfeasance by individual voters, the BES dataset contained two questions, from which we construct a binary and a continuous measure of perceived involvement.
The binary measure was the individual response to the following question (AAQ142): 'Now, thinking about the MP in your local constituency, has he or she claimed expense money to which they are not entitled? ' [1=Yes, 2=No, 3=Don't Know] . Respondents who did not know were omitted. The continuous measure was derived from the following question (AAQ143): 'On a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means a very small amount, and 10 means a very large amount, how much expense money do you think the MP in your local constituency has claimed that he or she was not entitled to?'
[12=Don't Know]. As above, respondents who did not know were omitted. The continuous measure for perceived wrongdoing was then calculated as: log(1+AAQ142+AAQ143).
Correlates of voters' perception of malfeasance
What determines perceived involvement of an MP in the expenses scandal? In Table 7, are more dissatisfied with democracy also perceive a higher involvement (the causation is clearly not obvious). More educated respondents tend to perceive lower involvement. This effect is particularly strong and statistically significant for respondents with a university degree. Other individual characteristics do not appear to have statistically significant effects.
In column 3, we include the response to the question "most MPs are corrupt" (with the possible answers being "agree" or "disagree") and show that perception of corruption of own MP is positively related to perceived corruption of all MPs. Although this is probably a spurious correlation, it provides evidence of the existence of some form of generalization, whereby a respondent perceiving that her MP is corrupt may be led to generalize this perception to all MPs, or conversely, a general distrust of
MPs may lead to perceive that the local MP is corrupt. These results are derived from within constituency variation and cannot therefore depend on the identity of the MP, on her behaviour, or on any other event that might have happened at the constituency level.
An important question is whether perception of involvement may have been influenced by media exposure. For this purpose, we construct various indicators of exposure to television, the press or the internet. Ceteris paribus (in particular, we control for education levels), respondents that declare to make a big deal of internet usage to gather political information have generally a more positive view of their MP's involvement in the scandal, while television viewers are more negative (column 4).
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In all specifications partisanship appears to be particularly important. The partisan-match dummy variable is equal to 1 if the MP belongs to the political party indicated as closest by the respondent (and zero otherwise) and it appears to have a strong negative effect on perceived involvement in the scandal, even when constituency fixed effects are introduced and therefore perception cannot depend on any characteristic of the MP or of the constituency. An important concern is that partisanship, which is measured before the 2010 election but after the scandal, could depend itself on the perceived involvement of the local MP and therefore be an endogenous regressor.
To address this concern we use the 2005-2010 BES panel data. In column 5, partisanship is measured 22 However, interaction terms between media exposure and media coverage of the scandal are statistically insignificant. Interaction terms between indicators of media exposure and Legg-money are equally insignificant.
This is equally true whether we use newspaper readership, television exposure, or internet usage. In other words, the responsiveness of perceived involvement to either press coverage of the scandal or money owed does not appear to be affected by media exposure. In the interest of space we omit the table with these results but they available from the authors upon request.
in 2005, well before the expenses scandal. Despite a much reduced sample size, the partisan match coefficient remains statistically significant, negative and its size is actually larger than in other columns. In column 6 we include an interaction effect between the partisan match dummy and Leggmoney. The negative and statistically significant coefficient of the interaction term indicates that the elasticity of perceived involvement to actual wrongdoing is much reduced for co-partisan MPs. 23 Our results show that perception of wrongdoing is significantly affected by partisanship. Further investigation is necessary to understand the reason of this partisan bias, which could be due to cognitive dissonance or to media exposure. Our results on media coverage of the scandal (see section 6) let us presume that the first explanation is more plausible.
Voting behaviour
Does perceived involvement in the scandal relate to citizens' decisions to vote or not for an incumbent MP? Whether in the binary or the continuous form, we find that perceived malfeasance of an incumbent MP decreased the likelihood of voting for the incumbent party, controlling for characteristics of the respondent, of the MP, and of the constituency. The results are summarized in Table 8 . In this case, the result holds both when we include only constituencies with standing MPs and when we include all constituencies (provided the boundary change was within the 10% limit). These results are robust across specifications and change only marginally if we include constituency fixed effects, therefore focussing on within constituency variation in scandal involvement perception. Such variation cannot be due to constituency characteristics and therefore can be due neither to MPs involvement nor to overall media coverage (although individual media exposure may vary).
Media coverage of the scandal
Our results suggest that media coverage of the scandal played a key role in determining punishment patterns. In this section we analyse media coverage in more detail, and we ask in particular how it relates to monetary wrongdoing and whether it is possible to detect any partisan bias 
Aggregate coverage
A first analysis of overall patterns of coverage is given by equation (4), where the news variables refer to the total number of articles in the seven newspapers pulled together.
where variable names have the usual interpretations and i indicates MP i. OLS estimates are reported in Table 9 . We only include party affiliation in column 1, we control for Legg-money and personal characteristics in column 2, and we include constituency characteristics in column 3. Our results show no significant difference in the overall coverage of MPs from different parties. Not surprisingly, we find a significantly higher coverage for senior and front-bench MPs and a strong positive correlation between coverage and Legg-money. Our result on gender is less obvious: we find a significantly higher coverage of female MPs. In column 4, we restrict our sample to include only constituencies whose boundaries changed by less than 10%. Our conclusions remain unaffected and the magnitude of the female dummy is now substantially larger. We have tried to restrict our sample using other thresholds of percentage change in constituencies, and again, our conclusions remain unaffected (results are available from the authors).
Column 5 shows that coverage of Labour frontbenchers (the Government) was double the coverage of Conservative frontbenchers (the official Opposition) and both were significantly higher 24 For a discussion of agenda-setting theories in news-reporting and a description of how these can be scrutinized empirically using quantitative information on media coverage, see Larcinese et al. (2011) and Puglisi and Snyder (2011a) .
than the coverage of backbenchers. Although constituency marginality does not appear, on average, to have had any significant impact on press coverage, column 6 shows that Labour-held marginal constituencies were significantly less covered than non-marginal constituencies, while Conservative and Liberal-democratic marginal constituencies are not statistically distinguishable from nonmarginals. 25 Although these coefficients could just capture some spurious correlation, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that, although Government members were not spared press coverage, the party in government was.
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Finally, columns 7 and 8 include interactions between Legg-money and party affiliation. The elasticity of coverage to actual money misappropriated turns out to be larger for the Labour and particularly for the Conservative parties. In this case the coefficient for Conservative MPs is both larger and more robust, if we consider estimates restricted to constituencies which changed by less than 10%.
An analysis of media bias
In Table 10 , we perform an analysis of individual newspapers' behaviour focussing on possible differences in their coverage patterns. This means that we now estimate equation (4) We report our results when the seven equations are estimated as a system of seemingly unrelated equations (SURE), which provides more efficient estimates than seven separate OLS regressions. The coverage of all newspapers is well explained by Legg-money. An increase of 1% in Legg-money leads to an increased coverage between 3.2% (The Guardian) and 5.6% (The Times). We then distinguish between different parties and between back-benchers and front-benchers for the two 25 The same is true of marginal constituencies held by SNP and PC, which are classified as "Other marginal". 26 If we believe that news coverage captures some dimension of malfeasance which is missed by Legg-money, then an alternative interpretation could be that the most vulnerable MPs are also those that were more disciplined by re-election perspectives. Since a swing was expected against the Labour party, Labour-held marginals were likely to be the most vulnerable seats. 
In other words, we ask whether the responsiveness of coverage to actual wrongdoing depends on the political affiliation of the MP, and whether different behaviour can be ascribed to different newspapers. We find that the interaction effect with the Legg-money ( is positive for Labour and Conservatives MPs: in other words, responsiveness to money owed was larger for the two main parties. We report our estimates of for Conservative and Labour MPs in Figure 2 , from which it is clear that is larger for Conservative than for Labour MPs (although the difference between the two parties is not statistically significant). In this case, it is worth to highlight that the two most left-oriented newspapers in our sample (the Guardian and The Independent) are those with lowest for Labour MPs, while the highest are those of the two tabloids, The Sun and the Daily Mail. Once again, however, there are no other discernible signals of partisan coverage across newspapers.
In order to take into account the possibly different levels of coverage of the scandal by different newspapers, all our regressions have been repeated using MPs' coverage share (of expenses coverage with respect to total news) rather than number of articles. Results are substantively similar to those discussed here and therefore not reported (they are available from the authors).
To conclude, we find no clear evidence of partisan coverage of the expenses scandal across newspapers. For the seven newspapers examined, a number of patterns were evident, controlling for other explanatory variables: more senior MPs, front-bench MPs from the two main parties and female
MPs were mentioned more frequently. The interaction effect with the Legg-money ( is positive for
Labour and Conservatives MPs and leads us to uncover a possible under-coverage of Labour MP by
The Guardian and The Independent. In general, however, the patterns we found hold equally for all newspapers with little variation. Given the substantially higher coverage of front-benchers belonging to Labour (the party in government) and, in second place, of the frontbenchers of the main opposition party (potential government members), we can conclude that the role of the press was rather that of a watchdog placing under closer scrutiny the government and its potential replacement.
Quantifying the effects: an overall assessment
Do voters punish politicians they perceive to be corrupt? Our answer, for the case of the 2009 expenses scandal in the UK at least, is that they do, although perceptions can be biased by prior opinions. The path from wrongdoing to voter punishment, however, is rather complex, as we have tried to illustrate in this paper. It is useful, therefore, to synthetize our many regressions in few key quantities of interest. Figure 3 quantifies the key links in our accountability framework, by choosing in each case our benchmark estimates. From these estimates we can calculate a few quantities of interest, using the Legg report as a benchmark of malfeasance. We estimate that a 1% increase in irregularly claimed expenses leads to a 0.05% increase in reported news, and a 1 % increase in press coverage leads to 5% higher probability to step down and to a fall of 0.78% in the votes of standing MPs. Combining the effect of expenses on press coverage and the effect of coverage on the electoral outcomes, we have that a 1% increase in irregularly claimed expenses leads to a 0.25% higher probability of resignation and to a 0.04% loss in votes. Any effect is entirely channelled through news-reporting, as there is no independent effect of Legg-money either on the probability to step down or on the vote share of standing MPs. Finally, any change that may have occurred in the vote share of MPs involved in the scandal and standing for re-election has led to no change in their probability to be re-elected.
Regarding voters' perception of wrongdoing, it is influenced by an increase in misappropriated money both via press coverage (+0.18%) and directly via other means (+0.07%).
Our conclusion is that voters were 0.01% less likely to vote for an MP (0.25x0.04) for each 1% increase in misappropriated money.
If we consider how many factors can influence voting, the small effects that we estimate are not necessarily negligible. At the same time, punishment does not appear to be overwhelming, especially if we consider that the probability to be re-elected of a standing MP is not affected by the amount of money irregularly claimed (although the vote share is). If the final aim of the process is "to remove the rascals", then the standing down of the most involved MPs is the only mechanism which has actually led to a statistically significant change in the identity of elected representatives. This fact does not reduce the importance of elections in the accountability process in any way, since standing down (or de-selection by party leadership) is likely to be driven by fear of punishment in the ballot box.
Discussion
Our findings provide new evidence on a number of questions regarding the role of elections in keeping public officials accountable. The question of whether voters punish corrupt politicians has been addressed by numerous empirical works. Our findings are comparable to those of Jacobson and Dimock (1994) , who study a US House scandal (Bank overdraft scandal): like us, they find that members of Congress who were more involved in the scandal were more likely to retire but, unlike in our case, conditional on standing again, they were more likely not to be re-elected. 27 Looking at 27 Clarke et al. (1999) find that the scandal affected retirement decisions of Republican House members only.
corruption allegations during the period 1968 -1978 , Peters and Welch (1980 find that implicated Congressional candidates tend to be punished in terms of their electoral returns.
Our evidence provides support for theories that stress the importance of information availability for a well-functioning democracy. 28 The disclosure of information on MPs' detailed expenses items led to a wave of resignations and eventually to voters' punishment of the most involved MPs. Crucially, we find that, while information available on the press matters for resignations and electoral returns, an objective monetary measure of wrongdoing does not. Hence, our findings point to the importance of mass media as watchdogs of power, adding to the burgeoning literature on mass media bias (Groseclose and Milyo 2005; Larcinese et al 2011; Lott and Hasset 2004; Durante and Knight 2010; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; and Puglisi and Snyder 2011a, 2011b) , which has been so far mostly focussed on the US press. We provide a rather benign view of the British press, whose coverage of the scandal appears to have been positively linked to monetary wrongdoing, focussed on government members, and only marginally affected by ideological leanings.
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There are three other studies that have concomitantly analysed the UK expenses scandal.
Eggers and Fisher (2011) provide constituency-level evidence and show that involved MPs were more likely to stand down and, conditional on running, that they lost votes because of the scandal. Like us, they also conclude that punishment was personal rather than directed at parties. Johnston and Pattie (2012) and Vivyan et al. (2012) use BES data to conclude that there was a negative electoral impact for involved incumbents but that this impact was of modest magnitude, probably because voters were concerned with more pressing problems by the time of the 2010 general election.
Some of our results are similar to those found by these works, thus confirming the existence of an established set of "facts" regarding the scandal. Our results, however, explain why previous works find that the scandal had only a limited effect on voting behaviour. The reason is that the main channel 28 See for example Besley and Prat (2006) . For an overview of these theories, see Persson and Tabellini (2000) .
A fast expanding empirical literature has recently added increasingly reliable evidence of the importance of information for accountability purposes. See for example Besley and Burgess (2002) , Besley, Pande and Rao (2005) , Chang, Golden and Hill (2010) , and Ferraz and Finan (2008) . This last paper is most closely related to ours since it provides evidence on the consequences of corruption disclosure in mayoral elections in Brazil.
29 Puglisi and Snyder (2011a) find instead that the coverage of scandals by the US press follows their partisan leaning (as measured by their electoral endorsements).
of parliamentary change has been retirement: MPs involved in the scandal are significantly less likely to be in parliament after the 2010 election but mostly because they decided to stand down. This means that the selection effect of elections cannot simply be captured by looking at election results or voting behaviour since politicians may anticipate negative electoral outcomes and decide to stand down. Our conclusion is that elections do keep public officials accountable, at least in the case we study, but that their effect is mostly displayed at the candidacy stage.
Compared to previous research on the expenses scandal our work has also a number of advantages, both for what concerns the range of questions we address and from a purely methodological point of view. Our aim is to go beyond the "facts" trying both to establish causal relations and to "unpack" the mechanisms of accountability. In particular, there are two key features that distinguish our contribution from the mentioned other studies on the scandal: an explicit focus on the role of mass media (including a study of media bias) and a study of partisanship and the way it mediates the response to the scandal (both for newspapers and voters). From a methodological point of view, our work has two important advantages: in the analysis of constituency-level data, we provide placebo regressions in support of our causal claims; in the analysis of BES data, we show that our estimates are robust to the introduction of constituency fixed effects (which is equivalent to including an MP fixed effect), which allows us to better identify the impact of personal characteristics and exposure to news sources.
There are three other pieces of evidence emerging from our paper deserving separate discussions. First, we provide evidence of a strong effect of partisanship on voters' perception of their MPs' honesty. Our evidence shows that biased perception and sticky beliefs can represent a formidable obstacle to accountability and points at the complexity of the role played by partisanship in voters' mind.
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30 Our evidence is difficult to entirely square with spatial models of elections populated by rational voters and is more consistent with theories of cognitive dissonance, i.e. the idea that beliefs may be changed to achieve greater internal consistency (Festinger 1957) . Other evidence of instances of voters' cognitive dissonance is provided in Beasley and Joslyn (2001) and Mullainathan and Washington (2009) . Particularly relevant is the study of Dimock and Jacobson (1995) , which studies the aforementioned US House banking scandal and reaches conclusions very similar to ours.
Second, the results indicate a significant gendered effect, which suggests that the discrepancy between the stereotypical "ethical female" politician and involvement in the scandal led to greater punishment -both electorally and via internal party mechanisms -compared to their male counterparts. Although perceived exploitation of the allowances rules caused public outrage nationally, the voting public was perhaps less forgiving to female MPs, since there is an underlying image of the ruthless, ambitious male politician, whilst such behaviour from female politicians would seem more "unnatural". 31 These core attitudes about the gender and morality both influence and are influenced by the media. 32 In the context of the MP expenses scandal, what is perhaps linked to the higher rate of standing down is that media representations often mention female politicians alongside their husbands, such that they are seen in terms of dependency (Murray 2010; Romaine 1998) . Thus, despite powerful political roles, women are still reduced to providers of care and child-rearing in family structures. Perhaps this allows an easier escape route -that of spending more time with family -for female MPs involved in the scandal without significant loss of face for the MP, and female MPs may be seen as more expendable by party leaders.
Finally, our analysis shows that there is evidence of a "personal vote" (Cain et al. 1990 ), whereby MPs that have been deemed to have exploited the expenses system are punished if they stand for office in the 2010 general election, but there is no significant electoral punishment for a disgraced MP's political party if she/he stands down or resigns. 33 On one hand, the accountability mechanisms underlying the "personal vote" are straightforward: party leaders encourage misbehaving MPs to stand down (or resign), thus providing an internal means of policing ethical conduct in political office. The 31 Prior theoretical work has posited that females have a natural ethic of care and responsibility (Gilligan 1982) . This has been supported by social science research confirming that females tend to act more ethically and altruistically compared with males (Ones and Viswesvaran 1998; Eagly and Crowley 1986; Piliavin and Unger 1985; Hoffman 1977; Johnson and Aries 1983) . Starting from this notion of the "ethical female", some commentators have concluded that an increase in accountability can be fostered through greater female political participation (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001 ), although this relationship may be spurious (Sung 2002) .
party then replaces the "bad" MP with a candidate not involved in the scandal, which means that there should be no electoral punishment. On the other hand, the "personal vote" is a surprising result, since, in the throes of a global recession, the perceived exploitation of the expenses system by some MPs represented corruption carried out and condoned by all three major parties. Thus, although punishment at the polls for all three parties could be expected as a systemic electoral protest, this largely failed to materialise (for example, we find no impact of the scandal on turnout). However, as mentioned above, partisanship still mediates perceptions of wrong-doing, so that voter political party affinities still affect the likelihood of sanctioning an incumbent MP for her/his behaviour during the expenses scandal. Voters' perception of misconduct Table 2 have been included in all regressions. Columns 1 and 2 also include the main effect of rebellion and absences. Each coefficient refers to the interaction term between the variable in question and news-post. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the MP announced decision to stand down at the next election. In the -pre-columns the announcement was made before May 8, 2009 , in the -post-columns the announcement was made after May 8, 2009. Region dummies are included (referred to the 11 standard UK regions). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** see table 13 for a complete list). In regressions with constituency fixed effects (columns 5-8) only constituencies with at least four observations are kept. There are 316 constituency fixed effects in columns 5 and 6 and 252 in columns 7 and 8. Region fixed effects consists of the 11 UK standard regions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In specifications without constituency fixed effects, standard errors are clustered at the constituency level. 
